A political scientist’s view on the election in Saxony-Anhalt: “We need to rethink our expectations”

How do you view the role of social media in this context?

Social media has a self-reinforcing effect, partly due to its business model. The longer people consume content on a platform, the more revenue it generates. Consequently, algorithms tend to show users content from their respective filter bubbles. Posts that work particularly well for the networks are those that trigger – sometimes negative – emotions whilst simultaneously providing a narrative that confirms this feeling. Contradictory or fact-based content appears rarely, if at all. The result: anyone who, for example, repeatedly hears negative claims about migration may get the impression that these must be true. This is particularly true when there is a lack of positive counter-arguments and facts demonstrating just how vital migration is for Germany’s survival. If this distorted perception becomes entrenched, fiction effectively becomes reality. So far, there has been little recourse against the way the algorithms operate, meaning that political polarisation is increasing significantly in the era of TikTok.

In your view, are the political developments in Saxony-Anhalt a regional phenomenon, or is there a pattern that could be repeated in other federal states?

Neither the rise of the AfD nor the election of far-right or right-wing populist parties is a phenomenon specific to eastern Germany. This is particularly true given that, in the past, voters in eastern Germany have tended to be ‘prone’ to fluctuating voting patterns between the left and the right. The National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), classified as far-right, entered several West German state parliaments in the late 1960s, and then, in the 2000s, also gained seats in the state parliaments of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The fact that the AfD was able to almost double its result in the 2026 state election in Baden-Württemberg – from 9.7 per cent in 2021 to 18.8 per cent – shows that it can make inroads in the West as well.

We have already discussed what fuels mistrust in democracy. What conditions must be met for people to trust the democratic system?

It is crucial that citizens perceive the state as capable of taking action. For example, because it specifically addresses the socio-economic and cultural lines of conflict mentioned at the outset. Whether by developing infrastructure in rural areas or by strengthening civil society and creating spaces for people to come together, which, at best, can also help to forge a sense of identity. We need places where different cultures can come together and have opportunities for exchange. Cutting funding for charitable organisations and reducing public service broadcasting runs counter to this. Nevertheless, it is important to me to emphasise that democracy in Germany functions effectively across all areas. To ensure this remains the case, we would do well to rethink our expectations. Democracy is not a delivery service; it thrives on participation. This is a day-to-day endeavour, particularly in highly diverse societies such as ours, which involves addressing contradictions and learning to tolerate them to a certain extent.

How do you see the future of democracy?

With reference to Professor Philip Manow, a colleague from the University of Siegen, I would point out that it is only with the benefit of hindsight that we will be able to see whether, or when, a democracy has reached its tipping point. Despite all the storm clouds on the horizon, I see encouraging examples of democracy’s resilience; its values of freedom and equality promise greater innovative potential than other political systems. A look back at history shows that democracy in Europe survived two World Wars in the 20th century and subsequently proved its worth. Furthermore, countries such as Poland and Hungary demonstrate that, even after governments have spent years dismantling the rule of law, pro-democratic parties can once again come to power.