PD Dr. Dr. Niels Skovgaard-Olsen
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Qualifications:
2025 –
2023 –
Heisenberg Position (DFG). PI of research project.
Privatdozent. Department of Social Psychology and Methodology. Institute of Psychology. University of Freiburg.
2023
Habilitation, venia legendi in Psychology („right to teach“). University of Freiburg.
2022 –
PI of research project “Norm Conflicts and Rationality”. German Research Council (DFG). Department of Social Psychology and Methodology. Institute of Psychology. University of Freiburg. https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/proj/9901
2017 – 2022
PostDoc Research Associate with teaching and supervision duties. Department of Cognitive and Decision Psychology. Institute of Psychology. University of Göttingen.⠀
2014 – 2017
PostDoc. DFG Project: Reason Relations, Argumentation, and Conditionals: Applying Ranking Theory to Psychology of Reasoning.
2014 – 2017
Dr. rer. nat. (PhD in psychology), Faculty of Economics and Behavioral Sciences, University of Freiburg. Institute of Psychology. Supervisor: Professor Dr. Karl Christoph Klauer. Dissertation defended with summa cum laude (“highest honour”).
2012 – 2014
Dr. phil. (PhD in philosophy), Faculty of Humanities, University of Konstanz. Supervisor: Professor Dr. Wolfgang Spohn. Dissertation defended with summa cum laude (“highest honour”).
Research networks:
2014 – 2018
Associate, What if – an interdisciplinary research group on conditionals and thought experiments with researchers from the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and history. DFG Research Unit FOR 1614
2016
International Rationality Summer Institute 2016
2012 – 2018
Member of New Frameworks of Rationality, DFG Priority Program SPP1516, which encompasses 14 projects in different parts of Germany from philosophy, psychology, and computer science.
Research visits:
2016-2017
Research visits at Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy and Birkbeck University.
2015
Visiting Scholar at Berkeley University.
Rewards:
2018
Best Student paper, New Frameworks of Rationality. (Prize for one of the chapters of my psychology dissertation.)
2015
Preis des Landkreises Konstanz zur Förderung des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses an der Universität Konstanz. (Award for excellent dissertations in philosophy and history.)
- Empirical and theoretical rationality research (psychology, philosophy)
- Pragmatics and Semantics
- Psychology of Reasoning
- Empirical and theoretical research on norms and agency
- Moral Psychology
- Psychology of Causality
- Computational methods and statistical modelling
2025 –
Heisenberg Programme: Grant for 5-year research project awarded by DFG (German Research Council). (697.230 €)
2022 – 2026
Grant for research project awarded by DFG (German Research Council). (377.590 €)
2014 – 2017
Grant application and project administration for 3-year PostDoc project, carried out by me, which was awarded by DFG to Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Spohn. (210.000 €)
| Papers | |
|---|---|
| 2026 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Causal Markov Violations and Hidden Mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. |
| 2025 | Baron, J. and Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106296 |
| 2024 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Klauer, K. C. Invariance Violations and the CNI Model of Moral Judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 50(9), 1348-1367. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231164888 |
| 2023 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and John Cantwell (2023). Norm Conflicts and Epistemic Modals. Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101591 |
| 2023 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Collins, P., and Klauer, K. C. Possible Worlds Truth Table Task. Cognition, 238, 105507. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105507 |
| 2021 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Collins, P. Indicatives, Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent. Cognitive Science, 45(11). https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13058 |
| 2021 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Stephan, S., and Waldmann, M. Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(12), 2472-2505. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001062 |
| 2021 | Kern-Isberner, G., Skovgaard-Olsen, N., and Spohn, W. Ranking Theory and Cognitive Science. In: Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (eds.), Handbook of Rationality (pp. 337-345). The MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262045070/the-handbook-of-rationality/ |
| 2020 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Relevance and Conditionals: A Synopsis of Open Pragmatic and Semantic Issues. In: Elqayam, S., Douven, I., Cruz, N., Evans, J. (eds.), Logic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind, Routledge (pp. 192-206). https://www.routledge.com/Logic-and-Uncertainty-in-the-Human-Mind-A-Tribute-to-David-E-Over/Elqayam-Douven-Evans-Cruz/p/book/9781138084254 |
| 2019 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. The Dialogical Entailment Task. Cognition, 193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104010 |
| 2019 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Kellen, D., Hahn, U., and Klauer, K. C. Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. Psychological Review, 126(5), 611-633. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000150 |
| 2019 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Collins, P., Krzyzanowska, K., Hahn, U., & Klauer, C. K. Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection. Cognitive Psychology, 108, 42-71.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2018.11.002 |
| 2017 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Kellen, D., Krahl, H., and Klauer, K. C. Relevance differently affects the truth, acceptability, and probability evaluations of ‘And’, ‘But’, ‘Therefore’, and ‘If Then’. Thinking and Reasoning, 23(4), 449-482. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2017.1374306 |
| 2017 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Kellen, D., Hahn, U., and Klauer, K. C. Conditionals, Individual Variation, and the Scorekeeping Task. In: M. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink, & E. Davelaar (Eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. London, UK: Cognitive Science Society. https://www.proceedings.com/35829.html |
| 2017 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Singmann, H., and Klauer, K. C. Relevance and Reason Relations. Cognitive Science, 41(S5), 1202-1215. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12462 |
| 2016 | Raidl, E. and Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46(6), 577-609. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-016-9411-0 |
| 2016 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Motivating the Relevance Approach to Conditionals. Mind & Language, 31(5), 555-79.https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12120 |
| 2016 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Singmann, H., and Klauer, K. C. The Relevance Effect and Conditionals. Cognition, 150, 26-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.017 |
| 2015 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science. 40(4), 848-880.https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12267 |
| 2015 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. The problem of logical Omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments. Synthese, 194(3), 917-939.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7 |
| 2014 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged vs. Consequential Commitments. In: Proceedings of AISB50. London, UK: Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behavior. http://doc.gold.ac.uk/aisb50/AISB50-S21/AISB50-S21-Olsen-paper.pdf |
| 2014 | Olsen, N. S. Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy. Open Journal of Philosophy. https://10.4236/ojpp.2014.43031 |
| 2010 | Olsen, N. S. Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith. European Journal of Philosophy, 18(4), 510-38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00360.x |
| Under Review and in Preparation | |
|---|---|
| under review | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Klauer, K. C. Norm Conflicts and Morality: The Conflict Model of Moral Decision-Making. |
| under review | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Ideal Bayesian Rationality and Deductive Competence. |
| under review | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Klauer, K. C. Comment on: Probabilities of conditionals: The relevance effect might be confounded by the existence of boundary cases (2025) by Zhan and Wang |
| Dissertations and Habilitation | |
|---|---|
| 2023 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Reasoning Studies. From Single Norms to Individual Differences. (Habilitation in Psychology, University of Freiburg) |
| 2017 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Putting Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory of Conditionals to the Test. (Psychology Dissertation, University of Freiburg) |
| 2014 | Olsen, N. S. Making Ranking Theory useful for Psychology of Reasoning. (Philosophy Dissertation, University of Konstanz) |
| Book Reviews | |
|---|---|
| 2017 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Sellars and His Legacy Ed. By James O’Shea (Book Review). In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 55 (2), 358-59. |
| Public Engagement | |
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| 2017 | Interview on rationality research for Danish psychology journal in: (2017), Fornuft og følelse. P: Psykologernes fagmagasin, 7(3), p. 23. |
| 2016 | Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Rationality Summer Institute, September 4-16. The Reasoner, 10(10), p. 84. |
| Invited Talks | |
|---|---|
| 2025 | Markov Violations and Hidden Mechanisms. Post-SPP-Meeting New Frameworks of Rationality (July 25, 2025). Berlin, Germany. |
| 2025 | Markov Violations and Hidden Mechanisms. London Reasoning Workshop. (July 16, 2025). London, UK. |
| 2025 | Markov Violations and Hidden Mechanisms. Experimental argument analysis: Interdisciplinary perspectives on verbal reasoning. (July 09, 2025). Norwich, UK. |
| 2023 | Norm Conflicts and Morality: The Conflict Model of Moral Decision-Making. International Moral Psychology (IMP) Seminar Series. (October 02, 2023). Kent, UK. |
| 2023 | Norm Conflicts and Morality: The Conflict Model of Moral Decision-Making. London Reasoning Workshop. (July 25, 2023). London, UK. |
| 2022 | Latent Truth Tables. The 17th Conference of the Swiss Psychological Society (September 5, 2022). Zürich, Switzerland. |
| 2022 | Invariance Violations and the CNI Model of Moral Judgments. London Reasoning Workshop. (July 26, 2022). London, UK. |
| 2022 | Norm Conflicts and Might Statements. Logic Colloquium. University of Connecticut (April 1, 2022). |
| 2021 | Inferentialism and Causality. Symposium on Inferentialism. ICT-2021 (International Conference of Thinking), Paris. (June 23, 2021). |
| 2021 | Normative Pluralism and Might Statements. Symposium on normative pluralism. ICT-2021 (International Conference of Thinking), Paris. (June, 21, 2021). |
| 2020 | Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries. University of Amsterdam, Holland (March 15, 2021). |
| 2020 | Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries. „If ifs and ands were pots and pans …“: Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning and conditionals (August 28, 2020). Regensburg, Germany. |
| 2020 | Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries. Neuroscience Online Seminar, University of Göttingen (June 22, 2020). Göttingen, Germany. |
| 2019 | Conditional Probabilities and Causal Power. London Reasoning Workshop (July 18, 2019). London, UK. |
| 2019 | The Dialogical Entailment Task. Dagstuhl Seminar, (January 14, 2019). Dagstuhl, Germany. |
| 2018 | Ranking Theoretic Semantics for Conditionals and the Psychology of Reasoning. What If, Closing Conference (October 12, 2018). Konstanz, Germany. (with Eric Raidl) |
| 2018 | Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Invited Symposium: Normative and descriptive approaches to human reasoning. (September 13, 2018). Rijeka, Croatia. |
| 2018 | A Synoptic View on Relevance Effects. New Perspectives on Conditionals and Reasoning. (September 5, 2018). Regensburg, Germany. |
| 2018 | Relevance and Conditionals. London Reasoning Workshop. (July 25, 2018). London, UK. |
| 2018 | Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection. Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality. (February 19, 2018). Etelsen, Germany. |
| 2018 | A Synoptic View on Relevance Effects. What if, Scientific Retreat. (January 12, 2018). Konstanz, Germany. |
| 2017 | Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality. (March 7, 2017). Etelsen, Germany. |
| 2016 | Relevance differently affects the truth, acceptability, and probability evaluations of ‘and’, ‘but’, ‘therefore’, and ‘if then’. Symposium with Igor Douven, On “the epistemology of conditionals”. (June 10, 2016). Konstanz, Germany. |
| 2016 | Putting the Relevance Approach and the Suppositional Theory to the Test. Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality. (March 22, 2016). Etelsen, Germany. |
| 2016 | Compositional Reason Relation Semantics. What-if research group, University of Konstanz. (January 12, 2016) Konstanz, Germany. |
| 2015 | Perceived Relevance and Reason Relations. What-if research group, University of Konstanz. (July 10, 2015). Konstanz, Germany. |
| 2015 | Perceived Relevance and Reason Relations. Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality. (March 16, 2015). Etelsen, Germany. |
| 2015 | The Relevance Effect and Conditionals. Berkeley, Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics and Science. (September 23, 2015). Berkeley, USA. |
| 2015 | Relevance and Reason Relations. Gießener Abendgespräche Kognition und Gehirn. (June 10, 2015). Gießen, Germany. |
| 2014 | On how to make ranking theory useful for Psychology of Reasoning. Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality. (March 10, 2014). Etelsen, Germany. |
| 2013 | Representations and Perceptual Experiences. University of Konstanz. (Juni 6, 2013). Konstanz, Germany. |
| Conferences | |
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| 2024 | Norm Conflicts and Morality: A Validation Study. International Conference of Thinking at The University of Milan-Bicocca. (June, 12, 2024). Milan, Italy. |
| 2023 | Norm Conflicts and Morality: The Conflict Model of Moral Decision-Making. Third European Experimental Philosophy Conference. (September 15th, 2023). Zürich, Switzerland. |
| 2021 | Indicatives, Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent. 43rd Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society (DGfs). Workshop SPOCC. (February 25, 2021). Freiburg, Germany. |
| 2019 | Conditionals, Reason Relations, and Causality. EuroCogSci. (September 2, 2019). Bochum, Germany. |
| 2017 | Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. Second Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy Group Germany. (November 17, 2017). Osnabrück, Germany. |
| 2017 | Relevance and Conditionals. ECAP9, European Congress of Analytic Philosophy. (August 22, 2017). München, Germany. |
| 2017 | Conditionals, Individual Variation, and the Scorekeeping Task. Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (July 27, 2017). London, UK. |
| 2017 | Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. Reasoning Club. (May 19, 2017). Turin, Italy. |
| 2016 | Norm Conflicts and Conditionals. International Conference of Thinking at Brown University. (August 5, 2016) Providence, USA. |
| 2015 | Perceived Relevance and Reason Relations. Danish annual meeting of philosophy, University of Aarhus. (March 7, 2015). Aarhus, Denmark. |
| 2014 | Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged vs. Consequential Commitments. AISB50 (Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation for Behaviour), Goldsmiths, University of London. (April 3, 2014) London, UK. |
| 2013 | On how to make Philosophical Theories useful for Scientific Purposes. Danish annual meeting of philosophy, Syddansk Universitet. (March 9, 2013) Odense, Denmark. |
| 2012 | Brandom, TCA, and the Social Foundation of Objectivity. Danish annual meeting of philosophy, Roskilde Universitet. (March 2, 2012) Roskilde, Denmark. |
| Seminars and Lectures Taught in German or English | |
|---|---|
| 2025 | Higher Cognition: Recent Trends in Moral Psychology, MSc Seminar, University of Freiburg. |
| 2025 | Higher Cognition: Psychology of Risk, Preferences, and Decision-Making, MSc Seminar, University of Freiburg. |
| 2024 | Higher Cognition: Recent Trends in Moral Psychology, MSc Seminar, University of Freiburg. |
| 2024 | Higher Cognition: Understanding Causality: Psychological Perspectives, MSc Seminar, University of Freiburg. |
| 2023 | Higher Cognition: Recent Trends in Moral Psychology, MSc Seminar, University of Freiburg. |
| 2022 | Judgment and Decision Making. Seminar and Lecture (with Prof. Dr. Michael Waldmann), University of Göttingen. |
| 2021 | Learning Theory. Three parallel seminars. Undergraduate psychology, University of Göttingen. Hybrid teaching. One online seminar and two classroom seminars with occasional hybrid participation via Zoom. |
| 2021 | Judgment and Decision Making. Online Seminar and Lecture (with Prof. Dr. Michael Waldmann), University of Göttingen. Taught via Zoom and BBB. |
| 2020 | Learning Theory. Three parallel seminars. Undergraduate psychology, University of Göttingen. Taught via Zoom. |
| 2020 | Judgment and Decision Making. Online Seminar and Lecture (with Prof. Dr. Michael Waldmann), University of Göttingen. Taught via Zoom and BBB. |
| 2019 | Learning Theory. Three parallel seminars. Undergraduate psychology, University of Göttingen. |
| 2019 | Judgment and Decision Making. Seminar and Lecture (with Prof. Dr. Michael Waldmann), University of Göttingen. |
| 2018 | Learning Theory. Three parallel seminars. Undergraduate psychology, University of Göttingen. |
| 2018 | Judgment and Decision Making. Seminar and Lecture (with Dr. Ralf Mayrhofer), University of Göttingen. |
| 2017 | Learning Theory. Three parallel seminars. Undergraduate psychology, University of Göttingen. |
| 2016 | Conditionals in Philosophy and Psychology (with Dr. Eric Raidl). BA seminar, University of Konstanz. |
| Guest Lectures | |
|---|---|
| 2023 | Guest lecture on Moral Psychologyfor MSc students, University of Freiburg. |
| 2021 | Guest lecture on Causality for MSc students, University of Göttingen. |
| 2017 | Guest lecture on Rationality and Psychology of Reasoning for MSc students, University of Freiburg. |
| University Didactic Course | |
|---|---|
| 2023-2024 | Didactic programme „On the Way to Becoming a Professor“ (Auf dem Weg zur Professur – Hochschuldidaktische Qualifizierung für Post Docs, Habilitand:innen und Junior-Professor:innen“). |
I supervise BSc and MSc theses on the psychology of reasoning, judgment and decision making, psychology of causality, and moral psychology. Below are some examples of topics for MSc theses. BSc or MSc theses can be written in English or German.
In future, I may advertise a PhD position in moral psychology. Contact me if interested.
| Moral Psychology |
|---|
| Much of moral psychology is concerning with contrasting utilitarianism and deontology through moral dilemma. In Gawronski et al. (2017), a process-dissociation model of moral judgments is presented, which is called the CNI model. Via moral dilemma, the CNI model estimates parameters for responses due to a consequence-driven response, a norm-based response, and an inaction bias. Four conditions that factorially combine action and inaction according to deontological and utilitaristic norms in congruent and incongruent conditions enable the estimation of these parameters via multinomial processing tree framework. In Skovgaard-Olsen and Klauer (2024, ms), two model extensions of the CNI model were proposed, which either reject an invariance assumption in the CNI model or build in the possibility of conflicting response tendencies. Since these models introduce further parameters, experiments that systematically target one of these new parameters are possible as topics of MSc theses. Alternatively, experiments on group discussions of moral reasoning following the discussion in Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen (2025) could be pursued in a MSc thesis. Literatur Baron, J., and Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (2025). Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106296 Gawronski, B., Armstrong, J., Conway, P., Friesdorf, R., and Hütter, M. (2017). Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(3), 343-376. Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Klauer, K. C. (2024). Invariance violations and the CNI model of moral judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 10.1177/01461672231164888 Skovgaard-Olsen, N. and Klauer, K. C. (ms). Norm Conflicts and Morality: The Conflict Model of Moral Decision-Making. |
| Psychology of Causality |
|---|
| In psychology, the theory of causal Bayes nets (Pearl, 2009) makes up one of the primary normative frameworks for understanding human causal reasoning (Sloman, 2004; Waldmann, 2017). As one of its fundamental assumptions, causal Bayes nets assume the Markov assumption requiring that each variable Xi is independent of all its nondescendents, given its parents PAi in a given causal diagram. This assumption is in turn paramount on a practical level in reducing the complexity of the inference problem that we are faced with when making causal inferences in complex causal structures. What the Markov assumption allows us to do is to ignore information about the states of most of the variables in a causal network and focus our attention on the parent nodes, or the direct proxy causes, of a given variable. Empirically, there has thus been a strong interest in probing whether participants are then able to reason based on the Markov assumption in psychological experiments (Rehder, 2014; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2015; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017). However, according to a body of literature reviewed in Rottman & Hastie (2014), participants persistently violate the Markov assumption in psychological experiments. It has been suggested that postulating unobserved variables, and a hidden mechanism in the causal nets of the participants, may account for this behaviour. The goal of the MSc thesis is to conduct experiments testing this assumption. Alternatively, a MSc thesis may implement a manipulation of group discussion to the paradigm used in Skovgaard-Olsen (in review). Literatur Mayrhofer, R., & Waldmann, M. R. (2015). Agents and causes: Dispositional intuitions as a guide to causal structure. Cognitive Science, 39, 65–95. Rehder, B. (2014). Independence and dependence in human causal reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 72, 54–107. Rehder, B. & Waldmann, M. R. (2017). Failures of explaining away and screening off in described versus experienced causal learning scenarios. Memory & Cognition, 45(2), 245-260. Rottman, B. M., & Hastie, R. (2014). Reasoning about causal relationships: Inferences on causal networks. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 109–139. Skovgaard-Olsen, N. (in review). Markov Violations and Hidden Mechanisms. Sloman, S. (2005). Causal Models: How We Think About the World and Its Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waldmann, M. R. (Ed.). (2017). The Oxford handbook of causal reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| Decision Making |
|---|
| In Risk and Rationality, Buchak (2013) develops a normative theory of decision making called Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory (REU) in direct competition to classical Expected Utility Theory (EUT). While REU is formally related to descriptive rank-dependent utility theories in psychology and economics such as prospect theory (Wakker, 2010), Buchak argues that it has a stronger normative foundation (e.g., by only recognizing rank dependent probability weighing and not loss aversion or reference dependence) as a model of ideal instrumental rationality. Compared to EUT, REU stands out by adding a risk function that models the agent’s risk attitudes. EUT and REU thus make up a pair of competing normative theories with opposing normative implications which pose a problem of arbitration analogous to the problems of arbitration discussed above. The goal of the MSc thesis is to conduct experiments on known choice paradoxes applying Buchak’s (2013) theory. Literatur Buchak, L. (2013). Risk and rationality. Oxford University Press. Buchak, L. (2014). Risk and Tradeoffs. Erkenntnis, 79, 1091-1117. Buchak, L. (2025). A unified treatment of risk and ambiguity within a rank- dependentframework. Theory and Decision. Wakker, P. P. (2010). Prospect Theory. For Risk and Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| Ad hoc review for journals |
|---|
| Journal of Behavioral Decision Making |
| Journal of Cognitive Psychology |
| Journal of Experimental Psychology |
| Journal of Logic, Language, and Information |
| Journal of Memory and Learning |
| Memory and Cognition |
| Psychological Review |
| Thinking & Reasoning |
| Cognition |
| Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society |
| Topics in Cognitive Science |
| Experimental Psychology |
| Axiomathes |
| Mind & Language |
| Episteme |
| Erkenntnis |
| Logique et Analyse |
| Pragmatics and Philosophy |
| Synthese |
| Review of Philosophy and Psychology |
| Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology |
| British Journal of Psychology |
| Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |
| Philosophical Psychology |
| Frontiers in Psychology: Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology |
| Conferences |
|---|
| The Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society |
| The Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society |
| Publishers |
|---|
| Routledge |
| The MIT Press |