“NATO is historically unprecedented”
The transatlantic alliance turns 75 this year. Even 35 years after the end of the Cold War, it is still in existence. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, its role has become even more relevant. In this interview, contemporary historian Prof Dr Jan Eckel from the University of Freiburg talks about the objectives, crises and functions of NATO.
Mr Eckel, NATO turned 75 on 4 April 2024. Is it a success story?
Nato at least still exists – that is not a given and is remarkable because international politics has changed dramatically over the past 75 years. Especially as this organisation is historically unprecedented: there had never been such a permanent, far-reaching military and defence alliance involving so many states before – and nothing comparable has been created since. As a second answer to the question, I would say that in terms of what the founders and early creators of NATO had in mind, it has achieved many of its objectives.
What were NATO’s objectives when it was founded?
Above all, to prevent a war in Europe, which was at least successful for a long time, and to keep the Soviet Union in check. Linked to this was the goal of creating a close political alliance. This was to ensure that, on the one hand, the USA would be present in Europe – certainly also to exert influence – but on the other hand, the Europeans would also take care of their own defence. There is a famous sentence that nobody knows whether the first NATO Secretary General Lord Hastings Ismay actually said: The aim of the alliance was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” Especially at the beginning, there was great fear of a resurgence of German militarism. In fact, NATO actually contributed to these developments.
How has the role of NATO changed since it was founded, especially since the end of the Cold War?
From a historical perspective, much of the inner workings of this organisation have not yet been researched. As far as we can tell, however, NATO was never a static organisation; its history was already marked by economic cycles and crises during the Cold War. Even then, there was a need on the American side for the Europeans to do more for their own defence, including financially; there was the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and the withdrawal of the French armed forces under Charles de Gaulle at the end of the 1960s. Time and again, the question of who was actually authorised to make decisions within NATO had to be painstakingly balanced, and cooperation was not without friction. The NATO dual-track policy at the beginning of the 1980s, i.e. the decision to increase nuclear armament in Europe, provoked massive protests from civil society in many countries . In Germany, it provoked the largest demonstrations in the history of the Federal Republic at that point. And in the complicated transition phase of the 1990s, NATO actually went to war for the first time in Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia.
From today’s perspective, however, the decisive turning point was the end of the Cold War, because at that time the question arose as to what would happen to an organisation whose function was so strongly rooted in the Cold War. There is also a line from here to Russia’s current war against Ukraine: the Putin regime has long been spreading the narrative that the West made a promise that NATO would not be expanded eastwards. This promise has been broken, which only proves NATO’s aggressive and anti-Russian character. This shows one of the most important impulses of Putin’s policy: the loss of the empire after the end of the Soviet Union, which he has not yet come to terms with.
Today, it can be assumed with great certainty that there was no formal promise of any kind. But even in the academic debate, it is still a controversial question whether the US policy in the early 1990s was sensible and justified. At that time, it was decided relatively quickly that NATO would remain in place and that the reunified Germany would be included. And from the mid to late 1990s, it also became clear that NATO was to be expanded to include East-Central European states and that Russia would not be part of it. Whether we could have tried longer to make various offers of cooperation and keep options open is an important question, but one that must remain hypothetical.
NATO is historically unprecedented: there had never been such a permanent, far-reaching military and defence alliance encompassing so many states before – and nothing comparable has been created since.
Prof. Dr. Jan Eckel
Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Freiburg
Is NATO needed more urgently than ever after the Russian attack on Ukraine?
On the one hand, Donald Trump has fundamentally questioned the value of this alliance during his time in office, something that no American president before him has done since 1949. On the other hand, NATO has just been expanded again to include Finland and Sweden. The tradition of neutrality, which in some cases goes back centuries, played a particularly important role in Sweden’s self-image. But the threat assessment in Sweden has obviously changed so much that Sweden is breaking with this tradition and becoming a member of NATO. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic countries have already been looking at Russia differently than the majority of German politicians did at the time. I think a collapse or dissolution of NATO is certainly not to be expected in the near future; in my view, Putin miscalculated: He wanted a weaker NATO, but what he got was a stronger one. Trump’s re-election, however, would bring greater uncertainty as to what happens next.
What role will NATO play in the near future?
Today, NATO is once again being considered as a collective alliance against armed enemies; the focus is on deterrence mechanisms and how they work. International politics has changed dramatically, but the core Cold War situation is now back in a different form. Classic scenarios are once again being discussed: What happens if Putin uses nuclear missiles? What happens if he next attacks a NATO member such as Poland or the Baltic states? In that case, the alliance could actually come into play, with NATO’s entirety providing assistance to a member in the event of an attack. Incidentally, this is something that never happened once during the Cold War: in its 75-year history, NATO has only declared casus foederis once, after the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001.
Prof. Dr Jan Eckel has been Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Freiburg since 2021. His research focuses on the history of the humanities and history, human rights and international politics in the 20th century. Eckel is involved in the Cluster of Excellence initiative “Constitution as Practice in Times of Transformation (ConTrans)” at the University of Freiburg. For more information about the cluster as well as Freiburg’s excellence strategy, click here: