‘Thinking About What Objectivity Means in Concrete Terms’

And what follows from this analysis for scientific practice?

The way to respond to this analysis is highly disputed – also in the field of feminist epistemologies itself. Allow me to name two important positions: One of them is so-called feminist empiricism. It states that science doesn’t live up to its claim of conducting neutral aperspectival research due to the distortions touched upon above, and that we must thus be more rigorous and take appropriate measures – such as scrutinizing data and how they are collected more critically – to remove these distortions as far as possible. Other positions go further and say that objectivity as aperspectivism is already misconception – because it leads us precisely to repeatedly ignore social conditions as a part of scientific practices and to fail to analyse them. The philosopher Sandra Harding calls this ‘weak objectivity’. The alternative she suggests, ‘strong objectivity’, makes self-reflection of the social environment into a part of every scientific project. Her position is referred to as standpoint theory, which takes marginalized positions as a starting point but of course does not stop there.

Does this mean that what is at issue is objectivity and value-freedom as classical demands of science?

Those are two central terms in the field – but the debates on them differ: Most feminist epistemologists maintained from the outset that we cannot and do not want to abandon objectivity as an ideal, but we need to understand it differently. The case of value-freedom is different: In epistemology, it’s now largely undisputed that value-freedom as an ideal is neither possible nor necessary. For example, ethics committees contribute certain moral values to research, there are criteria for receiving research funding, universities have mission statements. … But even at the heart of scientific practices, where it’s all about hypotheses, evidence, and so on, non-epistemic values play a role, and thus values that are not only aimed at truth – for instance in risk assessments in medical research. Feminist epistemologists already addressed that very early on.

But that doesn’t mean that science and political activism are the same thing.

No, it means that we need to continue to be objective and neutral in science – but that we need to think about what this means in concrete terms. And it means that the popular distinction ‘science deals with facts, politics with values’ is incorrect. Science is always permeated with political-moral decisions; it’s also a good thing that we are not just amoral knowledge workers. On the other hand, we also have to avoid the simple solution of claiming that everything is politics in the end anyway. The sciences are interested in producing evidence – and it cannot be produced at will.

What productive approaches do you see in current feminist epistemologies?

There’s the debate initiated by Miranda Fricker over epistemic injustice, the insight that specific forms of injustice can emerge in the domain of knowledge. An example is the bias against women or people of colour when passing on knowledge – it can be demonstrated that these speakers are given less credibility due to prejudices. A second, related field is the so-called epistemology of ignorance, in which ignorance is analysed as an active practice of not wanting to know. In Germany, for example, the federal government repeatedly prevents systematic investigations of racism in security agencies. Compelling studies have also been conducted on practices of not wanting to know in everyday life. A third, currently very productive domain is the combination of feminist epistemologies with post- and decolonial approaches.

Why do such topics often provoke such violent reactions?

For one thing, self-reflective considerations cast doubt on what one previously knew and did: It can be annoying and very disturbing to deal with what objectivity means, because it calls into question one’s previous practice. In addition, the reactions have something to do with a deep-seated sexism and androcentrism in the sciences. This has been sufficiently proven, and it’s unpleasant to be reminded that one perhaps perpetuates such structures unnoticed. In addition, authoritarian right-wing movements worldwide have long used so-called anti-genderism as a central theme to mobilize support. However, many critics refuse to even take note of what’s actually being written and discussed in the field of feminist epistemologies. Our book is motivated by the perhaps idealistic hope that there are people who want to know more and find the uncertainty that may thereby arise to be beneficial – not least for current political debates.

The interview was conducted by Thomas Goebel